Binary code similarity approaches compare two or more pieces of binary code to identify their similarities and differences. The ability to compare binary code enables many real-world applications on scenarios where source code may not be available such as patch analysis, bug search, and malware detection and analysis. Over the past 20 years numerous binary code similarity approaches have been proposed, but the research area has not yet been systematically analyzed. This paper presents a first survey of binary code similarity. It analyzes 61 binary code similarity approaches, which are systematized on four aspects: (1) the applications they enable, (2) their approach characteristics, (3) how the approaches are implemented, and (4) the benchmarks and methodologies used to evaluate them. In addition, the survey discusses the scope and origins of the area, its evolution over the past two decades, and the challenges that lie ahead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Binary code similarity approaches compare two or more pieces of binary code e.g., basic blocks, functions, or whole programs, to identify their similarities and differences. Comparing binary code is fundamental in scenarios where the program source code is not available, which happens with commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) programs, legacy programs, and malware. Binary code similarity has a wide list of realworld applications such as bug search [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , malware clustering [16] , [17] , [18] , malware detection [19] , [20] , [21] , malware lineage [22] , [23] , [24] , patch generation [25] , patch analysis [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [8] , [30] , [31] , porting information across program versions [32] , [26] , [27] , and software theft detection [33] .
Identifying binary code similarity is challenging because much program semantics are lost due to the compilation process including function names, variable names, source comments, and data structure definitions. Additionally, even when the program source code does not change, the binary code may change if the source is recompiled, due to secondary changes introduced by the compilation process. For example, the resulting binary code can significantly change when using different compilers, changing compiler optimizations, and selecting different target operating systems and CPU architectures. Furthermore, obfuscation transformations can be applied on both the source code and the generated binary code, hiding the original code.
Given its applications and challenges, over the past 20 years numerous binary code similarity approaches have been proposed. However, as far as we know there does not exist a systematic survey of this research area. Previous surveys deal with binary code obfuscation techniques in packer tools [34] , binary code type inference [35] , and dynamic malware analysis techniques [36] . Those topics are related because binary code similarity may need to tackle obfuscation, binary code type inference may leverage similar binary analysis platforms, and malware is often a target of binary code similarity approaches. But, binary code similarity is well-separated from those topics as shown by previous surveys having no overlap with this paper on the set of papers analyzed. Other surveys have explored similarity detection on any binary data, i.e., not specific to code, such as hashing for similarity search [37] and similarity metrics on numerical and binary feature vectors [38] , [39] . In contrast, this survey focuses on approaches that compare binary code, i.e., that disassemble the executable byte stream. This paper presents a first survey of binary code similarity. It first identifies 61 binary code similarity approaches through a systematic selection process that examines over a hundred papers published in research venues from different computer science areas such as computer security, software engineering, programming languages, and machine learning. Then, it systematizes four aspects of those 61 approaches: (1) the applications they enable, (2) their approach characteristics, (3) how the approaches have been implemented, and (4) the benchmarks and methodologies used to evaluate them. In addition, it discusses the scope and origin of binary code similarity, its evolution over the past two decades, and the challenges that lie ahead.
Binary code similarity approaches widely vary in their approach, implementation, and evaluation. This survey systematizes each of those aspects, and summarizes the results in easy to access tables that compare the 61 approaches across multiple dimensions, allowing beginners and experts to quickly understand their similarities and differences. For example, the approach systematization includes, among others, the number of input pieces of binary code being compared (e.g., oneto-one, one-to-many, many-to-many); the granularity of the pieces of binary code analyzed (e.g., basic blocks, functions, programs); whether the comparison happens at the syntactical representation, the graph structure, or the code semantics; the type of analysis used (e.g., static, dynamic, symbolic), and the techniques used for scalability (e.g., hashing, embedding, indexing). The implementation systematization includes the binary analysis platforms used to build the approach, the programming languages used to code it, the supported architectures for the input pieces of binary code being compared, and whether the approach is publicly released. The evaluation systematization covers the datasets on which the approaches are evaluated and the evaluation methodology including the type of evaluation (e.g., accuracy, comparison wih prior works, performance) and how the robustness of the approach is evaluated in face of common code transformations such as compiler and compilation option changes, different architectures, and obfuscation.
Beyond the systematization, this survey also discusses how binary code similarity has evolved from binary code diffing to binary code search and how the focus has moved from a single architecture to cross-architecture approaches. It shows that the present of the field is vibrant as many new approaches are still being proposed. It discusses technical challenges that remain open, but concludes that the future of the area is bright with important applications scenarios under way such as those related to binary code search engines and the Internetof-Things.
Paper structure. This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of binary code similarity. Section III details the scope of the survey and the paper selection process. Section IV summarizes applications of binary code similarity and Section §V the evolution of the field over the last two decades. Section VI systematizes the characteristics of the 61 binary code similarity approaches, Section VII their implementation, and Section VIII their evaluation. Finally, we discuss future research directions in Section IX, and conclude in Section X.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we first provide background on the compilation process ( §II-A). Then, we present an overview of the binary code similarity problem ( §II-B).
A. Compilation Process
Binary code refers to the machine code that is produced by the compilation process and that can be run directly by a CPU. The standard compilation process takes as input the source code files of a program. It compiles them with a chosen compiler and optimization level and for a specific platform (defined by the architecture, word size, and OS) producing object files. Those object files are then linked into a binary program, either a stand-alone executable or a library.
Binary code similarity approaches typically deal with an extended compilation process, illustrated in Figure 1 , which adds two optional steps to the standard compilation process: source code and binary code transformations. Both types of transformations are typically semantics-preserving (i.e., do not change the program functionality) and are most commonly used for obfuscation, i.e., to hamper reverse-engineering of the distributed binary programs. Source code transformations happen pre-compilation. Thus, their input and output are both source code. They can be applied regardless of the target platform, but may be specific to the programming language used to write the program. On the other hand, binary code transformations happen post-compilation. Thus, their input and output are binary code. They are independent of the programming language used, but may be specific to the target platform.
Obfuscation is a fundamental step in malware, but can also be applied to benign programs, e.g., to protect their intellectual property. There exist off-the-shelf obfuscation tools that use source code transformations (e.g., Tigress [40] ), as well as binary code transformations (e.g., packers [41] ). Packing is a binary code transformation widely used by malware. Once a new version of a malware family is ready, the malware authors pack the resulting executable to hide its functionality and thus bypass detection by commercial malware detectors. The packing process takes as input an executable and produces another executable with the same functionality, but with the original code hidden (e.g., encrypted as data and unpacked at runtime). The packing process is typically applied many times to the same input executable, creating polymorphic variants of exactly the same source code, which look different to malware detectors. Nowadays, the majority of malware is packed and malware often uses custom packers for which off-the-shelf unpackers are not available [41] .
A main challenge in binary code similarity is that the compilation process can produce different binary code representations for the same source code. An author can modify any of the grey boxes in Figure 1 to produce a different, but semantically-equivalent, binary program from the same source code. Some of these modifications may be due to the standard compilation process. For example, to improve program efficiency an author may vary the compiler's optimization level, or change the compiler altogether. Both changes will transform the produced binary code, despite the source code remaining unchanged. An author may also change the target platform to obtain a version of the program suitable for a different architecture. In this case, the produced binary code may radically differ if the new target architecture uses a different instruction set. An author may also deliberately apply obfuscation transformations to produce polymorphic variants of the same source code. The produced variants will typically have the same functionality defined by the original source code. A desirable goal for binary code similarity approaches is that they are able to identify the similarity of binary code that corresponds to the same source code having undergone different transformations. The robustness of a binary code similarity approach captures the compilation and obfuscation transformations that it can handle, i.e., the transformations despite which it can still detect similarity.
B. Binary Code Similarity Overview
Binary code similarity approaches compare pieces of binary code. The three main characteristics of binary code similarity approaches are: (1) the type of the comparison (identical, similar, equivalent), (2) the granularity of the pieces of binary code being compared (e.g., instructions, basic blocks, functions), and (3) the number of input pieces being compared (one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many). We detail these three characteristics next. For simplicity, we describe the comparison type and comparison granularity for two inputs and then generalize to multiple inputs.
Comparison type. Two (or more) pieces of binary code are identical if they have the same syntax, i.e., the same representation. The binary code can be represented in different ways such as an hexadecimal string of raw bytes, a sequence of disassembled instructions, or a control-flow graph. Determining if several pieces of binary code are identical is a Boolean decision (either they are identical or not) that it is easy to check: simply apply a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA256) to the contents of each piece. If the hash is the same, the pieces are identical. However, such straightforward approach fails to detect similarity in many cases. For example, compiling the same program source code twice, using the same compilation parameters (i.e., same compiler version, same optimization level, same target platform) produces two executables with different file hash. This happens because the executable may include metadata that differs in both compilations such as the compilation date, which is automatically computed and included into the header of the generated executable. Two pieces of binary code are equivalent if they have the same semantics, i.e., if they offer exactly the same functionality. Equivalence does not care about the syntax of the binary code. Clearly, two identical pieces of binary code will have the same semantics, but different pieces of binary code may as well. For example, mov %eax,$0 and xor %eax,%eax are semantically equivalent x86 instructions because both set the value of register EAX to zero. Similarly, the same source code compiled for two different target architectures should produce equivalent executables, whose syntax may be completely different if the architectures use different instruction sets. Proving that two arbitrary programs are functionally equivalent is an undecidable problem that reduces to solving the halting problem [42] . In practice, determining binary code equivalence is a very expensive process that can only be performed for small pieces of binary code.
Two pieces of binary code can be considered similar if their syntax, structure, or semantics are similar. Syntactic similarity compares the code representation. For example, clone detection approaches consider that a target piece of binary code is a clone of some source binary code if their syntax are similar. Structural similarity compares graph representations of binary code (e.g., control flow graphs, callgraphs). It sits between syntactic and semantic similarity. The intuition is that the control flow of the binary code captures to some extent its semantics, e.g., the decisions taken on the data. Furthermore, the graph representation captures multiple syntactic representations of the same functionality. However, it is possible to modify the graph structure without affecting the semantics, e.g., by inlining functions. Semantic similarity compares the code functionality. A simple approach to semantic similarity compares the interaction between the program and its environment through OS APIs or system calls. But, two programs with similar system calls can perform significantly different processing on their output, so more finegrained semantic similarity approaches focus on a syntaxindependent comparison of the code.
Generally speaking, the more robust an approach is, i.e., the more transformations it can capture, the more expensive it also is. Syntactic similarity approaches are cheapest to compute, but least robust. They are sensitive to simple changes in the binary code, e.g., register reallocation, instruction reordering, replacing instructions with semantically equivalent ones. Structural similarity sits in the middle. It is robust against multiple syntactical transformations, but sensitive to transformations that change code structure such as code inlining or removal of unused function parameters. Semantic similarity is robust against semantics-preserving transformations, despite changes to the code syntax and structure, but it is very expensive to compute for large pieces of binary code.
Comparison granularity. Binary code similarity approaches can be applied at different granularities. Common granularities are instructions; basic blocks; functions; and whole programs. To perform a comparison at a coarser granularity, some approaches use a different comparison at a finer granularity, and then combine the finer granularity results. For example, to compare whether two programs are similar, an approach could determine the fraction of identical functions between both programs. Thus, we differentiate between the input granularity, i.e., the granularity of the input pieces of binary code that the approach compares, and the approach granularities, i.e., the granularities of the different comparisons in the approach. Applying a specific comparison at a finer granularity may restrict the type of comparison that can be performed at a coarser granularity, as illustrated in Figure 2 . The figure shows that computing whether two pieces of binary code are identical at a finer granularity (e.g., basic block) can be used to compute that the coarser granularity pieces that encompass them (e.g., their functions) are identical, equivalent, or similar. However, similarity at a finer granularity cannot be used to infer that the coarser granularity code is equivalent or identical. For example, when comparing two functions, just because all their basic blocks are similar, it cannot be concluded that the functions are identical or equivalent. On the other hand, similarity is the most general type of comparison and any finer granularity comparison type can be used to infer it.
Number of inputs. Binary code similarity approaches can compare two or more pieces of binary code. Those that compare more than two pieces can further be split into comparing one piece to the rest or comparing each piece to all other pieces. Thus, we identify three types of approaches based on the number of inputs and how they are compared: one-to-one (OO), one-to-many (OM ), and many-to-many (M M ). The source of the input pieces is application-dependent. They may come from the same program version (e.g., two functions of the same executable), from two versions of the same program, and from two different programs.
One-to-one approaches compare an original piece of binary code (also called source, old, plaintiff, or reference) to a target piece of binary code (also called new, patched, or upgrade). Most OO approaches perform binary code diffing, i.e., they diff two consecutive, or close, versions of the same program to identify what was added, removed, or modified in the target (patched) version. The granularity of binary code diffing is most often functions and the diffing tries to obtain a mapping between a function in the original program version and another function in the target program version. Added functions are original functions that cannot be mapped to a target function; removed functions are target functions that cannot be mapped to an original function; and modified functions are mapped functions that are not identical.
One-to-many approaches compare a query piece of binary code to many target pieces of binary code. Most OM approaches perform binary code search, i.e., they search if the query piece is similar to any of the target pieces and return the top k most similar target pieces of binary code. The target pieces may come from multiple versions of the same program (different than the version the query piece comes from), from different programs compiled for the same architecture, or from programs compiled for different architectures.
In contrast to OO and OM approaches, many-to-many approaches do not distinguish between source and target pieces. All input pieces are considered equal and compared against each other. These approaches typically perform binary code clustering, i.e., they output groups of similar pieces of binary code called clusters.
III. SCOPE & PAPER SELECTION
To keep our survey of the state-of-the-art focused and manageable it is important to define what is, and what is not, within scope. Overall, the main restriction is that we focus on works that compare binary code. This restriction, in turn, introduces the following four constraints: 1) We exclude approaches that require access to the source code, namely source-to-source (e.g., [43] ) and source-tobinary (e.g., [44] ) similarity approaches. 2) We exclude approaches that operate on bytecode (e.g., [45] , [46] ). 3) We exclude behavioral approaches that compare similarity exclusively on the interaction of a program with its environment through system calls or OS API calls (e.g., [47] , [48] , [49] , [50] ). 4) We exclude approaches that consider binary code as a sequence of raw bytes with no structure such as file hashes (e.g., [51] ), fuzzy hashes (e.g., [52] , [53] ), and signaturebased approaches (e.g., [54] , [55] ). Approaches need to disassemble raw bytes into instructions to be considered.
While we do not include the papers describing bytelevel approaches, we do examine the use of some of those techniques (e.g., fuzzy hashing) by the analyzed approaches.
In addition, we introduce the following constraints to keep the scope of the survey manageable: 5) We limit the survey to papers published on peer-reviewed venues and technical reports from academic institutions. Thus, we do not analyze tools, but rather the research works describing their approach (e.g., [26] , [27] for BINDIFF). 6) We exclude papers that do not propose a new binary code similarity approach or technique, but simply apply offthe-shelf binary code similarity tools as a step towards their goal.
Paper selection. To identify candidate papers, we first systematically examined all papers published in the last 20 years in 14 top venues for computer security and software engineering: IEEE S&P, ACM CCS, USENIX Security, NDSS, ACSAC, RAID, ESORICS, ASIACCS, DIMVA, ICSE, FSE, ISSTA, ASE, and MSR. Not all relevant binary code similarity approaches have been published in those venues, which is especially true for early approaches. To identify candidate papers in other venues, we extensively queried specialized search engines such as Google Scholar using terms related to binary code similarity and its applications, e.g., code search, binary diffing, bug search. We also carefully examined the references of the candidate papers for any further papers we may have missed. This exploration identified over a hundred candidate papers. We then read each candidate paper to determine if they proposed a binary code similarity approach that satisfied the above scope constraints.
In the end, we identified the 61 binary code similarity research works in Table I , whose approaches are systematized. The first three columns of Table I capture 
IV. APPLICATIONS
This section motivates the importance of binary code similarity by describing the applications it enables. Of the 61 papers analyzed, 36 demonstrate an application, i.e., present a quantitative evaluation, or case studies, of at least one application. The other 23 papers present generic binary code similarity capabilities that can be used for multiple applications such as binary diffing tools (e.g., [84] , [85] , [86] ), binary code search platforms (e.g., [72] , [62] , [71] ), and binary clone detection approaches (e.g., [74] , [73] , [56] , [65] ). Table II summarizes the eight applications identified. Most of the 36 [4] , ESH [5] , GENIUS [6] , BINGO [7] , BINSEQUENCE [8] XMATCH [9] , GITZ [10] , GEMINI [12] , FIRMUP [13] , BINARM [14] , αDIFF [15] , VULSEEKER [ [33] papers demonstrate a single application, although a few (e.g., F2004, BINSEQUENCE) demonstrate multiple. One property of an application is whether the application compares different versions of the same program (patch analysis, patch generation, porting information, malware lineage), different programs (malware clustering, malware detection, software theft detection), or can be applied to both cases (bug search). Next, we detail those applications. 1) Bug search -Arguably the most popular application of binary code similarity is finding a known bug in a large repository of target pieces of binary code [2] , [3] , [4] , [6] , [11] , [12] , [9] , [8] , [7] , [15] , [5] , [10] , [13] , [14] , [1] . Due to code reuse, the same code may appear in multiple programs, or even in multiple parts of the same program. Thus, when a bug is found, it is important to identify similar code that may have reused the buggy code and contain the same, or a similar, bug. Bug search approaches take as input a query buggy piece of binary code and search for similar pieces of binary code in a repository. A variant of this problem is cross-platform bug search, where the target pieces of binary code in the repository may be compiled for different platforms (e.g., x86, ARM, MIPS) [3] , [4] , [6] , [12] , [9] , [7] , [15] , [10] , [13] . 2) Malware detection -Binary code similarity can be used to detect malware by comparing a given executable to a set of previously known malware samples. If similarity is high then the input sample is likely a variant of a previously known malware family. Many malware detection approaches are purely behavioral, comparing system or API call behaviors (e.g., [47] , [48] ). However, as described in Section III, we focus on approaches that use binary code similarity [19] , [20] , [21] . 3) Malware clustering -An evolution of malware detection is clustering similar, known malicious, executables into families. Each family cluster should contain executables from the same malicious program, which can be different versions of the malicious program, as well as polymorphic (e.g., packed) variants of a version. Similar to malware detection, we focus on approaches that compare binary code [16] and exclude purely behavioral approaches based on system calls and network traffic (e.g., [50] , [87] , [88] ). 4) Malware lineage -Given a set of executables known to belong to the same program, lineage approaches build a graph where nodes are program versions and edges capture the evolution of the program across versions. Lineage approaches are most useful with malware because version information is typically not available [22] , [23] , [24] , [89] . Since input samples should belong to the same family, malware lineage often builds on the results of malware clustering. 5) Patch generation and analysis -The earliest binary code similarity application, and one of the most popular, is to diff two consecutive, or close, versions of the same program to identify what was patched in the newer version. This is most useful with proprietary programs where the vendor does not disclose patch details. The diffing produces small binary code patches that can be efficiently shipped to update the program [25] . It can also be used to automatically identify security patches that fix vulnerabilities [30] , analyze those security patches [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [31] , [8] , and generate an exploit for the old vulnerable version [90] . 6) Porting information -Binary code similarity can be used for porting information between two close versions of the same program. Since close versions typically share a large amount of code, the analysis done for one version may be largely reusable for a newer version. For example, early binary code similarity approaches ported profiling data [32] , [91] and analysis results obtained during malware reverse engineering [26] , [27] . 7) Software theft detection -Binary code similarity can be used for identifying unauthorized reuse of code from a plantiff's program such as the source code being stolen, its binary code reused, a patented algorithm being reimplemented without license, or the license being violated (e.g., GPL code in a commercial application). Early approaches for detecting such infringements used software birthmarks, i.e., signatures that capture inherent functionality of the plaintiff program [92] , [93] . However, as described in Section III, we exclude signature-based approaches and focus on approaches using binary code similarity [33] .
V. BINARY CODE SIMILARITY EVOLUTION This section describes the origins of binary code similarity and its evolution over the last 20 years, highlighting some noteworthy approaches.
The origins. The origins of binary code similarity are in the problem of generating a patch (or delta) that captures the differences between two consecutive (or close) versions of the same program. Text diffing tools had existed since the 1970's (the popular UNIX diff was released in 1974) and had been integrated in early source code versioning systems such as SCCS [94] (1975) and RCS [95] (1985) . The increasing popularity of low bandwidth communication networks (e.g., wireless) and the limited resources in some devices, raised interest in techniques that would increase efficiency by transmitting a small patch that captured the differences between two versions of a binary, i.e., non-text, file, instead of transmitting the whole file. In 1991, Reichenberger proposed a diffing technique for generating patches between arbitrary binary files without any knowledge about the file structure [96] . The approach worked at the byte-level, instead of the line-level granularity of text diffing, and efficiently identified the byte sequences that should appear in the patch because they only appeared in the updated version and thus were not available in the original file to be patched. Several tools for generating and applying binary patches soon appeared such as RTPATCH [97] , BDIFF95 [98] , and XDELTA [99] . Those tools worked at bytelevel and could diff any type of file.
The first binary code similarity approaches are from 1999. That year, Baker et al. proposed an approach for compressing differences of executable code and built a prototype diffing tool called EXEDIFF [25] , which generated patches for DEC Alpha executables. Their intuition was that many of the changes when diffing two executable versions of the same program represent secondary changes due to the compilation process, as opposed to direct changes in the source code. One example they mentioned is register allocation that may change at recompilation. Another example they mentioned is that code added in the newer version would displace parts of the old code, and thus the compilation process would have to adjust pointer values in the displaced code to point to the correct addresses. Their idea was to reconstruct secondary changes at patch time, so that they would not need to be included in the patch, reducing the patch size. EXEDIFF is the earliest approach we have identified that focused on computing similarity between binary code, taking advantage of the code structure by disassembling the raw bytes into instructions.
Also in 1999, Wang et al. presented BMAT [32] , a tool that aligned two versions of a Windows DLL library executable to propagate profile information from the older (extensively profiled) version to a newer version, thus reducing the need for re-profiling. Their approach is the first to compare functions and basic blocks (EXEDIFF compared two sequences of instructions). It first matched functions in the two executables and then matched similar blocks within each matched function. It used a hashing technique to compare blocks. The hashing removed relocation information to handle pointer changes, but was order-sensitive.
The first decade. After the initial works of EXEDIFF and BMAT, we only identify 7 binary code similarity approaches in the next decade (2000-2009). However, some of these are highly influential as they extend binary code similarity from purely syntactical to also include semantics; they widen the scope from binary code diffing (OO) to also include binary code clustering (MM) and binary code search (OM); and they apply binary code similarity to malware.
In 2004, Thomas Dullien (alias Halvar Flake) proposed a graph-based binary code diffing approach that focused on the structural properties of the code by heuristically constructing a callgraph isomorphism that aligns functions in two versions of the same binary program [26] . This is the first approach to handle instruction reordering inside a function introduced by some compiler optimizations. A followup work [27] extended the approach to also match basic blocks inside matched functions (as done in BMAT) and introduced the Small Primes Product (SPP) hash to identify similar basic blocks despite instruction reordering. These two works are the basis for the popular BINDIFF binary code diffing plugin for the IDA disassembler [84] .
In 2005, Kruegel et al. proposed a graph coloring technique to detect polymorphic variants of a malware. This is the first approach that performed semantic similarity and MM comparison. They categorized instructions with similar functionality into 14 semantic classes. Then, they colored the inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG) using those classes. The graph coloring is robust against syntactical obfuscations such as junk insertion, instruction reordering, and instruction replacement. In 2008, Gao et al. proposed BINHUNT [28] to identify semantic differences between two versions of the same program. This is the first approach that checks code equivalence. It uses symbolic execution and a constraint solver to check if two basic blocks provide the same functionality.
In 2009, Xin et al. presented SMIT [16] , an approach that given a malware sample finds similar malware in a repository. SMIT is the first OM and binary code search approach. It indexes malware callgraphs in a database and uses graph edit distance to find malware with similar callgraphs.
The last decade. The last decade (2010-2019) has seen a huge increase in the popularity of binary code similarity, with 52 approaches identified. The focus on this decade has been on binary code search approaches, with an emphasis since 2015 on its cross-architecture version (16 approaches), and in recent years on machine learning approaches. In 2013, Wei et al. proposed RENDEZVOUS, a binary code search engine that given the binary code of a query function, finds other functions in a repository with similar syntax and structural properties. Reducing the search granularity from whole programs (SMIT) to smaller pieces of binary code such as functions enables an array of applications such as clone detection and bug search.
Most binary code search approaches target the bug search application. This application was first addressed on source code in 2012 by Jang et al. [100] . In 2014, David et al. proposed TRACY [1] , the first binary code search approach focused on bug search. TRACY used the concept of tracelets, an execution path in a CFG, to find functions similar to a vulnerable function. In 2015, Pewny et al. presented MULTI-MH [3] , the first cross-architecture binary code search approach. MULTI-MH indexed functions by their input-output semantics. Given a function compiled for one CPU architecture (e.g., x86) MULTI-MH can find similar functions compiled for other architectures (e.g., MIPS). This problem quickly gained traction due to the popularity of embedded devices. In 2016, Lageman et al. [72] trained a neural network to decide if two functions were compiled from the same source code. The use of deep learning has picked up in the last two years, e.g., αDIFF (2018), INNEREYE (2019), and ASM2VEC (2019).
VI. APPROACHES
In this section, we systematize the approaches of binary code similarity, describing the Approach Characteristics columns in Table I . We recommend the reader to print Table I in a separate page to have it in hand while reading this section.
A. Comparison Type

Columns: Input Comparison; Approach Comparison
This section discusses the type of comparison between the approach inputs, as well as the finer granularity comparisons that may be used by the approach.
Input comparison. All 61 works analyzed compare their inputs to identify similarity. That is, no approach identifies identical inputs (since a hash suffices for that) or input equivalence since it is an undecidable problem [101] that can only be solved efficiently for small pieces of binary code. Thus, we classify binary code similarity approaches based on their input comparison as: one-to-one (OO, 21 approaches), oneto-many (OM, 30 approaches), and many-to-many (MM, 10 approaches). The dominance of OM approaches is due to the high interest in binary code search in the last decade.
It is always possible to build an OM or M M approach from an OO approach. For example, a simple implementation of an OM approach is to compare the given query piece of binary code with each of the n targets using an OO approach that returns the similarity between both inputs. Then, simply rank the n targets by decreasing similarity and return the top k entries or the entries above a similarity threshold. However, most OM approaches avoid this simple implementation since it is inefficient. The two main solutions to improve performance are extracting a feature vector from each input and storing the target pieces of binary code in a repository with indices. Obtaining a feature vector for each input allows to perform the feature extraction only once per input. This offers significant benefits when the feature extraction is expensive, e.g., in the case of BLEX whose feature extraction requires executing a piece of binary code multiple times with different inputs. Once the feature vectors have been extracted, a similarity metric between two feature vectors is used. This similarity metric is typically cheap to compute as feature vectors are often numerical or Boolean. A common source of confusion is that some approaches propose similarity metrics, while others propose distance metrics. It is important to keep in mind that when the metrics are normalized between zero and one, the distance is simply one minus the similarity. The other solution used by OM approaches is adding indices on a subset of the features in the feature vector. The indices can be used to reduce the number of comparisons by applying the similarity metric only between the feature vector of the input piece of binary code and the feature vectors of selected targets more likely to be similar.
Approach comparison. Most approaches use a single type of comparison: similarity (42 approaches), equivalence (5), and identical (2) . Note that even if only one type of comparison is used in the approach, it may differ from the input comparison. For example, EXEDIFF looks for identical instructions in the process of diffing two programs. There are 12 approaches that use multiple comparison types at different granularities. Of those, six use identical comparison at finer granularities to quickly identify the same pieces of binary code (BMAT, DR2005, SWPQS2006, BINCLONE) or to reduce expensive comparisons such as graph isomorphism (SMIT, SPAIN). The other six use equivalence comparisons at finer granularities to capture semantic similarity.
B. Granularity
Columns: Input Granularity; Approach Granularities
We separate the input granularity from the granularities of the pieces of binary code compared in the approach (i.e., approach granularities) since it is common to use finer gran-ularities (e.g., functions) to compare coarser input granularity (e.g., whole programs).
We have identified 8 comparison granularities: instruction (I), set of related instructions (I*), basic block (B), set of related basic blocks (B*), function (F), set of related functions (F*), trace (T), and whole program (P). Instruction, basic block, function, and whole program are standard granularities that require no explanation. Related instructions (I*) are either consecutive (e.g., n-gram) or share a property (e.g., data dependent). They may belong to different basic blocks, and even to different functions. For example, TRACY groups instructions that collectively impact an output variable. Related basic blocks (B*) share structural properties (e.g., graphlets in a CFG) or belong to the same execution path. Basic blocks in a set may belong to the same or multiple functions. Related functions (F*) implement a program component such as a library, a class, or a module. Trace granularity compares the execution trace of two binary programs on the same input.
The most common input granularity is function (26 approaches) followed by whole program (25) and related basic blocks (4) . Whole program is the preferred input granularity for OO approaches (16/21 ) since most binary code diffing approaches try to establish a one-to-one mapping between all functions in the input programs, and also for M M (7/10 ) approaches that tend to cluster input programs. On the other hand, function is the preferred granularity for binary code search approaches (21/30 ) . Another four binary code search approaches use B* to identify code reuse that covers only a subset of a function or crosses function boundaries.
The most common approach granularity is function (30 approaches) followed by basic block (20) . The majority of approaches (47/61) use different input and approach granularities, i.e., use finer approach granularities to compare coarser input granularity. Most approaches with the same input and approach granularity perform function searches (12/14) . The 11 approaches that perform equivalence comparisons do so at fine granularities due to its low efficiency: six have B granularity, five I*, and one F. Some approaches accumulate features at a fine granularity that are never directly compared and thus do not show in the approach granularities column. For instance, GEMINI accumulates basic block features to generate a numerical vector at function granularity. Thus, only functions are compared.
C. Syntactic Similarity
Column: Syntactic similarity Syntactic approaches capture similarity of the code representation, more especifically they compare sequences of instructions. Most commonly, the instructions in a sequence are consecutive in the virtual address space and belong to the same function. The instructions in the sequence may first be normalized, e.g., considering only the mnemonic, only the opcode, or normalizing the operands into classes. We detail instruction normalization in Section VI-J and simply refer to instruction sequences in the rest of this subsection.
The instruction sequences may be of fixed or variable length. Fixed-size sequences are obtained by sliding a window over the instruction stream, e.g., over the linearly-ordered instructions in a function. This process is characterized by the window size, i.e., the number of instructions in the sequence, and the stride, i.e., the number of instructions to slide the start of the window to produce the next sequence. When the stride is smaller than the window size, consecutive sequences overlap. When the stride is one, the resulting sequence is called an n-gram. For example, given the sequence of instruction mnemonics {mov, push, add} two 2-grams will be extracted: {mov, push} and {push, add}. There are 7 works that use n-grams: IDEA, MBC, RENDEZVOUS, MUTANTX-S, EXPOSÉ, ILINE, and KAM1N0. Fixed-size sequences are also used by SWPQS2006 with a configurable stride larger than one. RENDEZVOUS, in addition to n-grams, also uses nperms, unordered n-grams that capture instruction reordering within the sequence. An n-perm may capture multiple n-grams, e.g., 2-perm {mov, push} captures 2-grams {mov, push} and {push, mov}.
The most common methods to compare instruction sequences are hashing, embedding, and alignment. Hashing is used by 6 approaches (BMAT, DR2005, SWPQS2006, SMIT, BINCLONE, SPAIN) to obtain a fixed-length value out of a variable-length instruction sequence. If the hash values are the same, the sequences are similar. Five approaches generate an embedding from n-gram sequences (IDEA, MBC, MUTANTX-S, EXPOSÉ, KAM1N0). Three approaches (EXED-IFF, TRACY, BINSEQUENCE) align two sequences to produce a mapping between them by inserting gaps in either sequence to account for inserted, removed, and modified instructions. These approaches define a similarity score when instructions are aligned, and a gap score when an instruction aligns with a gap. Other less common comparison methods are using vectors of Boolean features (ILINE) and encoding sequences as strings for indexing (RENDEZVOUS).
D. Semantic Similarity
Column: Semantic similarity Semantic similarity captures if the code being compared has similar effects, as opposed to syntactic similarity that captures similarity in the code representation. The semantics of a piece of binary code can be described by the changes it produces in the process state, i.e., updates to the content of registers and memory. We identify 26 approaches computing semantic similarity. Most of them capture semantics at basic block granularity because basic blocks are straight-line code without control flow. Three methods are used to capture semantics: instruction classification, input-output pairs, and symbolic formulas.
Instruction classification. The first approach to introduce semantics into binary code similarity was KKMRV2005, which classified instructions into 14 classes (e.g., arithmetic, logic, data transfer) and used a 14-bit value to capture the classes of the instructions in a basic block. This semantic color bitvector captures the effects of the basic block. This approach was later adopted by BMM2006, BEAGLE, FOSSIL, and SIGMA. Instruction classification can be used to compute semantic similarity, but cannot determine if two pieces of binary code are, or are not, equivalent.
Input-output pairs. Intuitively, two pieces of binary code are functionally equivalent if given the same input they produce the same output, for all possible inputs. Such equivalence is independent of the code representation and compares the final state after the code is executed, ignoring intermediate program states. This approach was proposed by Jiang et al. on source code [102] and later used by numerous binary code similarity approaches: BINHASH, MXW2015, BLEX, MULTI-MH, BINGO, CACOMPARE, SPAIN, KS2017 and IMF-SIM. It involves executing both pieces of binary code with the same input and comparing their output, repeating the process many times. If the output differs for any input, then the two pieces of binary code are not equivalent. Unfortunately, to determine that both pieces are equivalent, the approach would require testing all possible inputs, which is not realistic for any nontrivial piece of binary code. Thus, in practice, this approach can only determine that two pieces of binary code are likely equivalent, with a confidence proportional to the fraction of inputs that have been tested, or that they are not equivalent (with certainty). The tested inputs are typically selected randomly, although it is possible to use other selection rules, e.g., taking values from the program data section (CACOMPARE). It is generally a dynamic approach, but some approaches (e.g., MULTI-MH) evaluate concrete inputs on statically-extracted symbolic formulas.
Symbolic formula. A symbolic formula is an assignment statement in which the left side is an output variable and the right side is a logical expression of input variables and literals that captures how to derive the output variable. For instance, the instruction add %eax,%ebx can be represented with the symbolic formula EBX2 = EAX + EBX1 where EBX2 and EBX1 are symbols representing the values of the EBX register before and after executing the instruction. Eleven approaches use symbolic formulas: BINHUNT, IBINHUNT, BINHASH, EXPOSÉ, TRACY, RMKNHLLP2014, TEDEM, COP, MULTI-MH, ESH, and XMATCH. Of those, eight approaches extract symbolic formulas at basic block granularity, XMATCH and EXPOSÉ extract formulas for the return values of a function, and BINSIM extracts symbolic formulas from an execution trace that capture how the arguments of a system call were derived. Three methods are used to compare symbolic formulas: using a theorem prover to check for equivalence, comparing the semantic hash of the formulas to check for equivalence, and computing the similarity of the graph representation of the formulas. Theorem prover -BINHUNT introduced the idea of using theorem provers such as STP [103] or Z3 [104] to check if two symbolic formulas are equivalent, i.e., whether the output variable always contains the same value after the execution of both formulas, assuming that the input variables share the same values. The main limitation of this approach is that it is computationally expensive because it can only perform pairwise equivalence queries, the solving time quickly increases with formula sizes, and the solver may fail to return an answer for some queries. Note that a piece of binary code may have multiple outputs (registers and variables in memory), each represented by its own symbolic formula. These approaches need to try all pair-wise comparisons and check if there exists a permutation of variables such that all matched variables contain the same value. Semantic hashes -An alternative to using a theorem prover is to check if two symbolic formulas have the same hash, after normalizing the formulas (e.g., using common register names) and simplifying them (e.g., applying constant propagation). The intuition is that if the two symbolic formulas have the same hash they should be equivalent. Three approaches use semantic hashes: BINHASH, BINJUICE, and GITZ. Semantic hashes are efficient, but are limited in that it is possible for two equivalent formulas to have different hashes even after normalization and simplification. For example, reordering of symbolic terms in one of the formulas (e.g., due to instruction reordering) results in a different hash. Graph distance -XMATCH and TEDEM represent the symbolic formula of a basic block as a tree, and compute their similarity by applying graph/tree edit distance. Computing the graph/tree edit distance is more expensive than comparing semantic hashes, but the graph representation has the advantage over semantic hashes that it can handle term reordering.
E. Structural Similarity
Column: Structural similarity Structural similarity computes similarity on graph representations of binary code. It sits between syntactic and semantic similarity since a graph may capture multiple syntactic representations of the same code and may be annotated with semantic information. Structural similarity can be computed on different graphs. The three most common are the intraprocedural control flow graph (CFG), the inter-procedural control flow graph (ICFG), and the callgraph (CG). All three are directed graphs. In the CFG and ICFG, nodes are basic blocks and an edge indicates a control flow transition (e.g., branch, jump). Basic blocks in a CFG belong to a single function; each function has its own CFG. Basic blocks in the ICFG belong to any program function; there is one ICFG per program. In the CG, nodes are functions and edges capture caller-callee relationships.
The intuition behind structural approaches is that CG, ICFG, and CFGs are fairly stable representations whose structure varies little for similar code. Approaches that operate on the CG or ICFG have a whole program input granularity, while those that operate on CFGs may have function granularity, or use function similarity as a step towards whole program similarity. Structural similarity approaches may use labeled graphs. For example, F2004 and DR2005 use node labels in the CG to capture structural information about a function's CFG (e.g., number of instructions and edges). Other approaches label basic blocks in the CFG/ICFG with a feature vector that captures the semantics of the basic clock (e.g., KKMRV2005, BINJUICE) or its embedding (GENIUS, GEMINI, see §VI-F). Edge labels can be used to capture the type of control flow transfer (BMM2006) or to aggregate the semantic labels of source and destination nodes (FOSSIL).
Structural similarity is used by 27 approaches. 14 approaches operate only on CFGs; five on both CFGs and the CG; four only on the ICFG; and two only on the CG. There are also three approaches that use non-standard graphs: SIGMA proposes a semantic integrated graph that combines information from the CFG, CG, and register flow graph, while QSM2015 and LIBV use the execution dependence graph [105] . The remainder of this subsection discusses different approaches used to compute graph similarity.
(Sub)Graph isomorphism -Most structural similarity approaches check for variations of graph isomorphism. An isomorphism of two graphs G and H is an edge-preserving bijection f between their node sets such that if any two nodes u, v are adjacent in G, then f (u) and f (v) are also adjacent in H. Graph isomorphism requires that the node set cardinality is the same in both graphs, which is too strict for binary code similarity. Thus, approaches instead check for subgraph isomorphism, which determines if G contains a subgraph isomorphic to H. Subgraph isomorphism is a known NP-complete problem. Other approaches check for the maximum common subgraph isomorphism (MCS), which finds the largest subgraph isomorphic to two graphs and is also NP-Complete. Given the high complexity of both problems, approaches try to reduce the number of graph pairs that need to be compared, as well as the size of the compared graphs. For example, DR2005 avoids comparing CFGs with the same hash (match) and CFGs with very different number of nodes and edges (unlikely match). IBINHUNT reduces the number of nodes to consider by assigning taint labels to basic blocks. Only nodes with the same taint label are considered in the subgraph isomorphism. For candidate graph pairs that pass the filtering, approximate algorithms are used that can be grouped into greedy and backtracking. Greedy -These approaches perform neighborhood exploration. An initial set of matching nodes is first identified. Then, the matching is recursively expanded by checking only the neighbors (i.e., parents or children) of already matched nodes. BMAT, F2004, DR2005, LKI2013, TEDEM, MULTI-MH, KLKI2016, KAM1N0, BINSEQUENCE, and BINARM use this approach. A limitation of greedy algorithms is that early errors propagate, significantly reducing the accuracy. Backtracking -Backtracking algorithms fix a wrong matching by revisiting the solution, and if the new matching does not improve the overall matching it is reverted (BMM2006, BINHUNT, IBINHUNT, MXW2015, QSM2015, DISCOVRE). Backtracking is more expensive, but can improve accuracy by avoiding local optimal matching.
Optimization. An alternative used by four approaches (SMIT, BINSLAYER, CXZ2014, GENIUS) is to model graph similarity as an optimization problem. Given two CFGs and a cost function between two basic blocks, they find a bijective mapping between the two CFGs with minimum cost. Such bipartite matching ignores graph structure, i.e., does not use edge information. To address this, SMIT and BINSLAYER assign lower cost to connected basic blocks. To perform the matching, SMIT, BINSLAYER, and CXZ2014 use the O(n 3 ) Hungarian algorithm, while GENIUS uses a genetic algorithm. K-subgraph matching. KKMRV2005 proposed to divide a graph into k-subgraphs, where each subgraph contains only k connected nodes. Then, generate a fingerprint for each ksubgraph and the similarity of two graphs corresponds to the maximum number of k-subgraphs matched. Four other approaches later leveraged this approach: BEAGLE, CXZ2014, RENDEZVOUS, and FOSSIL.
Path similarity. There are three approaches (COP, SIGMA, BINSEQUENCE) that convert function similarity into a path similarity comparison. First, they extract a set of executions paths from a CFG, then define a path similarity metric between execution paths, and finally combine the path similarity into a function similarity.
Graph embedding. Another method used by GENIUS, VULSEEKER, and GEMINI, detailed in §VI-F, is to extract a real-valued feature vector from each graph and then compute the similarity of the feature vectors.
F. Feature-Based Similarity
Column: Feature-based, Machine learning A common method (28 approaches) to compute similarity is to represent a piece of binary code as a vector or a set of features such that similar pieces of binary code have similar feature vectors or feature sets. A feature captures a syntactic, semantic, or structural property of the binary code. Features can be Boolean, numeric, or categorical. Categorical features have discrete values, e.g., the mnemonic of an instruction. A feature vector typically has all numeric or all Boolean features, the latter is called a bitvector. Categorical features are typically first encoded into Boolean features using one-hot encoding or into real-valued features using an embedding. Of the 28 approaches, 21 use numeric feature vectors, six use feature sets, and BINCLONE uses bitvectors. Once the features have been extracted, a similarity metric between feature vectors or feature sets is used to compute the similarity. Common similarity metrics are the Jaccard index for feature sets, dot product for bitvectors, and the Euclidean or cosine distance for numeric vectors. Figure 3 shows two alternative methods for feature-based similarity. The top method comprises of two steps: feature selection and feature encoding. Feature selection is a manual process where an analyst uses domain knowledge to identify representative features. The alternative approach showed below is learning to automatically generate real-valued feature vectors, called embeddings, from training data. Embeddings are used by eight recent approaches (GENIUS, GEMINI, αDIFF, VULSEEKER, RLZ2019, INNEREYE, ASM2VEC, SAFE). Embeddings are used in natural language processing (NLP) to encode categorical features using real-valued numbers, which helps deep learning algorithms by reducing the dimensionality and increasing the density of feature vectors compared to onehot encoding. Embeddings enable automatic feature extraction and efficient similarity computation. But, features in embeddings do not provide information about what has been learnt.
Binary code similarity embeddings can be classified by the properties they captured and their granularity. The first binary code similarity approach using embeddings was GE-NIUS, later followed by VULSEEKER and GEMINI. All the three approaches build a graph embedding for the ACFG of a function, i.e., a CFG with nodes annotated with selected basic block features. While GENIUS uses clustering and graph edit distance to compute the embedding, VULSEEKER and GEMINI improve efficiency by training a neural network that avoids expensive graph operations. Later approaches (αDIFF, RLZ2019, INNEREYE, ASM2VEC, SAFE) avoid manually selected features by focusing on instruction, or raw byte, co-ocurrencence. In NLP, it is common to extract a word embedding that captures word co-occurrence (e.g., word2vec) and then build a sentence embedding that builds upon it. RLZ2019 and INNEREYE use an analogous approach by considering instructions as words and basic blocks as sentences. SAFE uses similar approach to create functions embedding than basic blocks. Also related is ASM2VEC that obtains a function embedding by combining path embeddings capturing instruction co-occurrence along different execution paths in the function. Instead of using instruction co-ocurrence, αDIFF computes a function embedding directly from the sequence of raw bytes of a function using a convolutional network.
Machine learning. We identify three uses of machine learning in binary code similarity approaches: (1) to generate an embedding as explained above, (2) to cluster similar pieces of binary code using unsupervised learning (BINHASH, MUTANTX-S, ILINE, RMKNHLLP2014, KLKI2016, GENIUS), and (3) to classify with a probability if the pieces of binary code are being compiled from the same source code (BINDNN, IMF-SIM). BINDNN is the first use of neural networks for binary code similarity. Instead of generating an embedding, BINDNN directly uses a neural network classifier to determine if two functions are compiled from the same source code. Surprisingly, BINDNN is not cited by later binary code similarity approaches including those using neural networks to build embeddings.
G. Hashing
Column: Locality sensitive hashing A hash is a function that maps data of arbitrary size to a fixed-size value. Hash values are compact to store, efficient to compute, and efficient to compare, which makes them great for indexing. Hashes operate at the raw-byte level. They are not especifically designed for binary code, but rather for arbitrary binary data. However, three classes of hashes have been used for binary code similarity: cryptographic hashes, locality-sensitive hashes, and executable file hashes. Cryptographic hashes capture identical, rather than similar, inputs. They are used by some binary code similarity approaches to quickly identify duplicates at fine granularity (e.g., basic block). Locality-sensitive hashes produce similar hash values for similar inputs, as oppossed to cryptographic hashes where a small difference in the input generates a completely different hash value. Executable file hashes take as input an executable file, but the hash computation only considers parts of the executable such as the import table or selected fields of the executable's header. Their goal is to output the same hash value for polymorphic variants of the same malware.
Locality sensitive hashing (LSH). LSH produces similar hash values for similar inputs, efficiently approximating a nearest neighbor search. LSH algorithms typically apply multiple hash functions on the given input and produce the same hash value for similar inputs, i.e., they increase collision probability for similar inputs. LSH is used in binary code similarity to boost performance. For example, it is used by OM approaches for indexing pieces of binary code, enabling efficient binary code search (KAM1N0, GEMINI, INNEREYE). Of the 11 approaches that use LSH, seven use MinHash [106] (BINHASH, MULTI-MH, GENIUS, BINSEQUENCE, BINSHAPE, CACOMPARE, BINSIGN), two do not specify the algorithm used (GEMINI, INNEREYE), SWPQS2006 uses the algorithm by Gionis et al. [107] , and KAM1N0 proposes its own Adaptive Locality Sensitive Hashing (ALSH).
Fuzzy hashing is a popular type of LSH used to compute similarity of arbitrary files. For example, the VirusTotal file analysis service [108] reports ssdeep [52] hashes for submitted files. Other fuzzy hashes include tlsh [53] , sdhash [109] , and mrsh-v2 [110] . None of the 61 approaches use them, but we briefly discuss them because they are often applied to executable files. When applied on executables, fuzzy hashes may capture similarity of the binary code, but also similarity of data present in the executables. This issue has been recently examined by Pagani et al. [111] . Their results show that when applied only on the code of the .text section they work significantly worse than when used for whole program similarity. In fact, they show that a byte change at the right position, extra nop instructions, and instruction swapping can degrade similarity significantly (in some cases bring it down to zero). They observe that when compiling the same source code with different optimizations, the data sections of the executables remain the same, which seems to be a key reason fuzzy hashes work better on whole executables.
Executable file hashes. This class of hashes are especifically designed for executable files. They are designed to output the same hash value for polymorphic variants of the same malware. The hash computation only considers parts of the executable that are less likely to change when simply repacking, or resigning, the same executable. They are not used by any of the 61 approaches, but we briefly describe three popular hashes for completeness. peHash [51] hashes selected fields of a PE executable that are less susceptible to changes during compilation and packing, e.g., initial stack size, heap size. ImpHash hashes the import 
H. Supported Architectures
Column: Cross-architecture A cross-architecture approach can compare pieces of binary code for different CPU architectures, e.g., x86, ARM, and MIPS. This differs from architecture-independent approaches (e.g., F2004) that support different architectures, but cannot cross-compare among them, i.e., they can compare two x86 inputs and two MIPS inputs, but cannot compare an x86 input with a MIPS input. There are 16 cross-architecture approaches, all proposed since 2015. A common application is given a buggy piece of binary code, to search for similar pieces of binary code, compiled for other architectures, which may also contain the bug. For example, to search for programs in firmware images where a version of OpenSSL vulnerable to Heartbleed has been statically compiled.
The code syntax for different architectures may significantly differ as they may use separate instruction sets with different instruction mnemonics, sets of registers, and default calling conventions. Thus, cross-architecture approaches compute semantic similarity. Cross-architecture approaches employ one of two techniques. Seven approaches lift the binary code to an architecture-independent intermediate representation (IR): MULTI-MH, MOCKINGBIRD, BINGO, XMATCH, CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP. Then, identical analysis can be peformeed on the IR, regardless of the origin architecture. The advantage is that the analysis only depends on the IR and the IR design can be outsourced to a separate group. Section VII details the specific architectures supported by each approach and the IRs they use. An alternative approach used by 9 approaches is to use feature-based similarity (discussed in §VI-F). These approaches use a separate module for each architecture to obtain a feature vector that captures the semantics of the binary code (DISCOVRE, BINDNN, GENIUS, GEMINI, αDIFF, VULSEEKER, RLZ2019, INNEREYE, SAFE).
I. Type of Analysis
Column: Static analysis; Dynamic analysis; Dataflow analysis Binary code similarity approaches can use static analysis, dynamic analysis, or both. Static analysis examines the disassembled binary code, without executing it. Instead, dynamic analysis examines code executions by running the code on selected inputs. Dynamic analysis can be performed online, as the code executes in a controlled environment, or offline on traces of the execution. Fifty one approaches use only static analysis, four use only dynamic analysis, and six combine both. The dominance of static analysis for binary code similarity is due to most applications requiring all the input code to be compared. This is easier with static analysis as it provides complete code coverage. Dynamic analysis examines one execution at a time and can only determine similarity of the code run in that execution. To increase the coverage of dynamic analysis, three approaches (IBINHUNT, BLEX, IMF-SIM) run the code on multiple inputs covering different execution paths and combine the results. However, it is infeasible to run any non-trivial piece of binary code on inputs that cover all possible execution paths.
One advantage of dynamic analysis is simplicity, as memory addresses, operand values, and control-flow targets are known at runtime, which sidesteps static analysis challenges such as memory aliasing and indirect jumps. Another advantage is that it can handle some obfuscations and does not require disassembly of the code, also difficult with obfuscated code [112] . Section VIII details which approaches have evaluated its robustness on obfuscated code. Overall, dynamic analysis has been used in binary code similarity for malware unpacking (SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM), for operating on trace granularity (BINSIM, KS2017), and for collecting runtime values for semantic similarity (BLEX, BINSIM, IMF-SIM).
Dataflow analysis is a common type of analysis that examines how values propagate through the code. It comprises of data sources to be tracked (e.g., registers or memory locations holding specific variables), propagation rules defining how values are propagated by different instructions or IR statements, and sinks, i.e., program points where to check the values reaching them. Of the 19 approaches that use dataflow analysis, 16 use symbolic execution to extract a set of symbolic formulas to compute semantic similarity ( §VI-D). SPAIN uses taint analysis to summarize the patterns of vulnerabilities and their security patches. And, IBINHUNT uses both taint analysis and symbolic execution. It first uses taint analysis as a filter to find pieces of binary code that process the same user input, restricting the expensive subgraph isomorphism computation to those with the same taint label. And, it computes basic block similarity using symbolic formulas. IMF-SIM uses backward taint analysis to infer pointer arguments of a function from dereference errors.
J. Normalization
Column: Normalization Syntactic similarity approaches often normalize instructions, so that two instructions that are normalized to the same form are considered similar despite some syntactic differences, e.g., different registers being used. Overall, there are 33 approaches that use instruction normalization. They apply the following three types of instruction normalization:
• Operand removal -A normalization used by nine approaches is to abstract an instruction only by its mnemonic or opcode, ignoring all operands. For example, add %eax, %ebx and add [%ecx], %edx would be both represented by add and considered similar, despite both using different operands. • Operand normalization -A normalization used by 17 approaches is to replace instruction operands with symbols that capture the operand type such as REG for register, MEM for memory, and IMM for immediate values. For example, add %eax, %ebx and add %ecx, %edx would be both represented as add REG, REG, matching the instructions despite different register allocations used by the compiler.
Operand normalization abstracts less than operand removal. For example, add [%ecx], %edx would be represented as add M EM, REG and thus be considered different from the above. Some approaches also use different symbols for general purpose registers and segment registers, and for operands of different sizes (e.g., RegGen8 and RegGen32 in BINCLONE). • Mnemonic normalization -A normalization used by 3 approches (BMAT, EXPOSÉ and ILINE) is to represent multiple mnemonics by the same symbol. For example, both BMAT and ILINE represent all conditional jumps (e.g., je, jne) with the same symbol to account for the compiler modifying jump conditions.
Another type of normalization is to ignore code that should not affect the semantics. For example, some instruction sets contain no-op instructions that do not change the process state. And, compilers often use no-op equivalent instructions for padding such as instructions that move a register to itself, e.g., mov %eax, %eax. No-op equivalent instructions do not matter for semantic similarity and structural similarity approaches, but since they change the syntax they may affect syntactic similarity approaches. Three approaches remove no-op instructions (ILINE, MXW2015, QSM2015). A few approaches also remove unreachable dead code (BMM2006, FIRMUP), which may be introduced by obfuscations; function epilogue and prologue (EXPOSÉ) instructions, which may make small unrelated functions to look similar; and functions added by the compiler to load the program, not present in the source code (BINGO, SIGMA).
VII. IMPLEMENTATIONS
This section systematizes the implementation of the 61 approaches. For each approach, Table III shows the static and dynamic platforms it builds on, the programming language used to implement the approach, whether the implementation supports distributing the analysis, the supported target program architectures and operating systems, and how the approach is released. A dash (-) indicates that we could not find the information (i.e., unknown), while a cross ( ) means unsupported/unused. Building a binary code similarity approach from scratch requires significant effort. Thus, all approaches build on top of previously available binary analysis platforms or tools, which provide functionality such as disassembly and control flow graphs for static analysis, or instruction-level monitoring for dynamic analysis. However, the implementation of an approach may only use a subset of the functionality offered by the underlying platform. The most popular static platform is IDA (42 approaches), followed by BAP (4), DynInst (3), and McSema (2) . IDA main functionalities are disassembly and building control flow graphs. Its popularity comes from supporting a large number of architectures. Some binary analysis platforms already support using IDA as their disassembler, so it is not uncommon to combine IDA and another platform (6 approaches). Among dynamic approaches, PIN is the most popular with 5 approaches, followed by TEMU and ANUBIS with 3 approaches each. Previous work has analyzed binary analysis platforms used by binary code type inferece approaches [35] . Since most platforms overlap, we refer the reader to that work for platform details, but provide an extended version of their table in the Appendix (Table V) with six extra platforms.
A few approaches build on top of previous binary code similarity approaches. One case is that both approaches have overlapping authors. For example, RMKNHLLP2014 is based on BINJUICE, and MXW2015 extends IBINHUNT, which already shared components with BINHUNT. The other case is using a previously released approach. For example, BINSLAYER and SPAIN use BINDIFF as a first stage filter to find matched functions. The most popular programming language is Python (20 approaches), followed by C++ (14) . One reason for this is that the majority of approaches use IDA for disassembly and IDA supports both C++ and Python plugins. Moreover, two approaches (KAM1N0, BINSIGN) have used distributed platforms, such as Hadoop, to distribute their analysis.
Binary code analysis can operate directly on a particular instruction set (e.g., x86, ARM) or convert the instruction set into an intermediate representation (IR). Using an IR has two main advantages. First, it is easier to reuse the analysis built on top of an IR. For example, supporting a new architecture only requires adding a new front-end to translate into the IR, but the analysis code can be reused. Second, complex instruction sets (e.g., x86/x86-64) can be converted into a smaller set of IR statements and expressions, which make explicit any side-effects such as implicit operands or conditional flags. There are 15 approaches that use an IR and most use the IR provided by the underlying platform. Out of 15 approaches, 5 use VINE provided by BITBLAZE (BIN-HUNT, IBINHUNT, COP, MXW2015, BINSIM), another 5 use VEX provided with VALGRIND (MULTI-MH, MOCKING-BIRD, CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP), and two use LLVM-IR (ESH, XMATCH). The remaining three approaches use SAGE III (SWPQS2006), METASM (TEDEM) and REIL (BINGO). It is surprising that only 6 of the 16 cross-architecture approaches use an IR (MULTI-MH, XMATCH, MOCKINGBIRD, CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP). The remaining approaches provide separate analysis modules for each architecture that typically output a feature vector with a common format.
The most supported architectures for the target programs to be analyzed are x86/x86-64 (59 approaches), followed by ARM (16) , and MIPS (10) . The only two approaches that do not support x86/x86-64 are EXEDIFF that targets Digital Alpha, and BINARM that targets ARM. There are 16 cross-architecture approaches and 9 approaches that support firmware. The first cross-architecture approach was MULTI-MH, which added support for ARM in 2015. Since then, ARM support has become very prevalent due to the popularity of mobile and IoT devices. It is worth noting that even if there are 42 approaches that use IDA, which supports more than 60 processor families, most approaches built on top of IDA only analyze x86/x86-64 programs. The most supported OS is Linux (41 approaches) followed by Windows (35) . Only 4 approaches support MacOS. Early approaches that focused on x86/x86-64 often used IDA to obtain support for both PE/Windows and ELF/Linux executables. Most recently, all approaches that leverage ARM support Linux, which is used by Android and also by many IoT devices. VIII. EVALUATIONS This section systematizes the evaluation of the 61 binary code similarity approaches. For each approach, Table IV summarizes the datasets used ( §VIII-A) and the evaluation methodology ( §VIII-B).
A. Datasets
The left side of Table IV describes the datasets used by each approach. It first shows the total number of executables used in the evaluation and their split into benign and malicious executables. Executables may come from different programs or correspond to multiple versions of the same program, e.g., with varying compiler and compilation options. Then, for approaches that have function granularity, it captures the total number of functions evaluated, and for approaches that analyze firmware, the number of images from where the executables are obtained. A dash (-) in a column means that we could not find the number in the paper. For example, SWPQS2006 evaluates on system library files in Windows XP, but the total number of executables is not indicated.
Most approaches use custom datasets, the one popular benchmark is Coreutils used by 18 approaches. In addition, approaches that evaluate on firmware use two openly available firmwares (ReadyNAS [113] and DD-WRT [114] ). Over half of the approaches evaluate on less than 100 executables, 7 on less than 1K, 8 on less than 10K, and only 8 on over 10K. Out of 61 approaches, 37 have evaluated only on benign programs, 8 only on malware, and 16 on both. This indicates that binary code similarity is also popular for malware analysis. However, of the 24 approaches evaluated on malware, only five use packed malware samples (SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM). These approaches first unpack the malware using a custom unpacker (SMIT) or a generic (writeand-execute) unpacker (BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM), and then compute binary code similarity. The rest have access to the malware's source code or to unpacked samples.
For binary code search approaches that use function granularity, the number of functions in the repository better captures the dataset size. The largest dataset is by GENIUS, which evaluates on 420M functions extracted from 8,126 firmwares. Prior approaches had evaluated on at most 0.5M functions, which demonstrates the scalability gains from its embedding approach. Five other approaches have evaluated on over 1M functions: FOSSIL (1.5M), BINSEQUENCE (3.2M), BINARM (3.2M), FIRMUP (40M), and GEMINI (420M), which uses the same dataset as GENIUS. In addition, INNEREYE has evaluated on a repository of 1.2M basic blocks.
B. Methodology
The right side of Table IV describes four aspects of the evaluation methodology used by each approach: robustness, accuracy, performance, and comparison with prior approaches.
Robustness. The first 8 columns on the right side of Table IV capture how authors evaluate the robustness of their approaches, i.e., their ability to capture similarity despite transformations applied to the input programs. First, it shows whether they use each of the four compilers we have observed being employed to compile the programs in the dataset: GCC, ICC, Visual Studio (MSVS), and Clang. Then, it captures whether the authors evaluate similarity between programs compiled with different compilation options (cross-optimization), between programs compiled with different compilers (crosscompiler), and between programs compiled for different architectures (cross-architecture). Finally, it captures whether the authors evaluate similarity when obfuscation transformations are applied to the input programs.
There are 34 approaches that evaluate robustness (at least one in the last four robustness columns) and 27 that do not. Many early works did not evaluate robustness. This evaluation has become increasingly popular as approaches mature. The most popular robustness evaluation is cross-optimization (23 approaches), followed by cross-compiler (19) , crossarchitecture (16) , and obfuscation (13) . There are 9 approaches that have evaluated cross-optimization, cross-compiler, and cross-architecture. Approaches that evaluate cross-compiler also typically evaluate cross-optimization, as it is a simpler case. Simlarly, approaches that evaluate cross-architecture typically also evaluate cross-compiler, as cross-architecture programs may be produced using different compilers. Note that it is possible for approaches to compile programs with multiple compilers, but not perform cross-compiler evaluation, i.e., not compare similarity between programs compiled with different compilers.
There are 13 approaches that have evaluated on obfuscated programs. Of those, two use only source code transformations (COP, ASM2VEC), three use only binary code transformations (KKMRV2005, TPM, BINSHAPE), five use packed malware (SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM), and three evaluate both source code and binary code transformations (BINSIM, IMF-SIM, FOSSIL).
Accuracy evaluation and comparison. There are 49 approaches that perform a quantitative evaluation of their accuracy using some ground truth ( ), and 12 that perform qualitative accuracy evaluation through case studies (). Quantitative evaluation most often uses standard accuracy metrics such as true positives, false positives, precision, and recall. However, two approaches propose novel application-specific accuracy metrics (ILINE, KS2017).
There are 33 approaches that compare with prior approaches. All of them compare accuracy and six also compare runtime. The top target for comparison is BINDIFF (13 approaches compare with it), followed by TRACY (5), DISCOVRE (4), and MULTI-MH (4). Comparing accuracy across binary code similarity approaches is challenging for multiple reasons. First, only a small fraction of the proposed approaches have publicly released their code (Section VII). Since most approaches are not publicly available, comparison is often performed by re-implementing previous approaches, which may require significant effort. One advantage of reimplementation is that approaches can be compared on new datasets. The alternative to re-implementation is to evaluate the new approach on the same dataset used by a prior approach, and compare with the reported results. This method is only used by 6 approaches (GENIUS, BINGO, XMATCH, CACOMPARE, GEMINI, and BINARM) likely because most datasets are custom and not publicly available. Fortunately, we observe that public code release has become more common in recent approaches. Second, the input comparison and input granularity may differ among approaches making it nearly impossible to perform a fair comparison. For instance, it is hard to compare in a fair manner an approach that identifies program similarity using callgraphs (e.g., SMIT) with an approach comparing basic blocks (e.g., INNEREYE). Third, even when the input comparison and input granularity are the same, the evaluation metrics and methodology may differ, significantly impacting the measured accuracy.
The latter challenge is best illustrated on binary code search approaches operating at function granularity. These approaches find the most similar functions in a repository to a given function. They return multiple entries ranked in descending similarity order and count a true positive if one of the topk most similar entries is a true match. Unfortunately, the values of k vary across approaches and significantly impact the accuracy, e.g., a 98% precision on top 10 is significantly worse than a 98% precision on top 3. Thus, it becomes hard to compare accuracy numbers obtained with different k values and it becomes tempting to raise k until a sufficiently high accuracy number is achieved. Furthermore, many approaches do not describe the similarity threshold used to determine that no similar entry exists in the repository. This means that they always find some similar entry in the repository, even if the similarity may be really low.
Performance. It is common (49/61) to measure the runtime performance of an approach. Runtime is typically measured end-to-end, but a few approaches report it for each approach component (e.g., BINSIM). Four approaches report their asymptotic complexity (BMM2006, SWPQS2006, ILINE, MOCKINGBIRD).
IX. DISCUSSION
This section discusses open challenges and possible future research directions.
Small pieces of binary code. Many binary code similarity approaches ignore small pieces of binary code, setting a threshold on the minimum number of instructions or basic blocks to be considered. Oftentimes, only pieces of binary code with a handful of instructions are ignored, e.g., functions with less than 5 instructions, but some approaches use large thresholds like 100 basic blocks in TRACY. Small pieces of binary code are challenging because they are common, may comprise of a single basic block that prevents structural analysis, and may have identical syntax despite different semantics. For example, setter functions that update the value of a field in an object have nearly identical syntax and structure, simply setting a memory variable with the value of a parameter. But, they may have very different semantics, e.g., setting a security level or updating a performance counter, Furthermore, semantic similarity techniques like instruction classification, symbolic formulas, and input-output pairs may fail to capture their differences, e.g., if they do not distinguish different memory variables. Similarity of small pieces of binary code remains an open challenge. One potential avenue would be to further incorporate context. Some structural approaches already consider the callgraph to match functions (e.g., F2004), but this does not always suffice. We believe that it may be possible to further incorporate other context like locality (e.g., how close the binary code is in the program structure) or data references (e.g., whether they use equivalent variables).
Source-to-binary similarity. Some applications like plagiarism detection may require source code to be compared with binary code. Early approaches for source-to-binary similarity used software birthmarks that capture inherent functionality of the source code [92] , [93] . Recently, source-to-binary similarity has been applied for searching if a known bug in open source code exists in some target binary code [44] . The availability of source code provides more semantics (e.g., variable and function names, types, comments) potentially improving accuracy compared to simply compiling the source code and performing binary code similarity. We believe other applications remain that require determining if a target piece of binary code has been compiled, or has evolved, from some given source code. For example, there may be programs for which source code is only available for an old version and there is a need to understand how newer binary versions have evolved from the original source code.
Data similarity. This survey has focused on binary code similarity, but programs comprise both code and data. There may be situations where the data used by the code is as important as the code, e.g., when the only change between versions of a program is in the data used such as changing parameters for a machine learning classifier. Furthermore, data may be stored in complex data structures that may be key to the functionality. There exists a long history of type inference techniques on binary code [35] , which we believe could be combined with binary code similarity to compare the data structures used by different pieces of binary code, or how two pieces of binary code use the same data structure.
Semantic relationships. A different aspect of semantic similarity is to identify binary code with related functionality, e.g., cryptographic or networking functions. This is challenging as code that is related in its functionality may not have the same semantics. For example, a decryption function is clearly related to its encryption function, but performs opposite operations. So far, most work has focused on domain specific techniques such as those for identifying cryptographic functions (e.g., [115] , [116] ). But, recently some approaches have started exploring domain-agnostic techniques [117] . We believe further work is needed to better define such semantic relationships and their identification.
Scalability. The largest binary code similarity evaluation so far is by GENIUS and GEMINI on 420M functions from 8,126 firmware images (500K functions per image). While that is a significant step from prior approaches, if we consider instead 100K unique firmware, a conservative number since it is expected that there will be 20 Billion IoT devices connected to the Internet by 2020 [118] , we need a binary code similarity approach that can handle 50 Billion functions. Thus, further improvements on scalability will be needed to realize the vision of binary code search engines.
Obfuscation. Many challenges still remain for binary code similarity on obfuscated code. For example, a recent study has shown that state of the art unpacking techniques can miss 20%-60% of the original code, e.g., due to incomplete function detection [89] . And, no binary code similarity approach currently handles virtualization-based packers such as Themida [119] and VMProtect [120] , which generate a random bytecode instruction set, transform an input piece of binary code into that bytecode instruction set, and attach an interpreter (or virtual machine) from the generated bytecode to native code. Furthermore, obfuscation is best addressed with semantic similarity, which has a challenge with obfuscation transformations that do not respect the original semantics of the code, but still perform its main goals.
Approach comparison. The variety of datasets and methodologies used to evaluate the approaches (e.g., top k evaluation for OM approaches), together with the absence of source code for many of them, makes it hard to perform a fair comparison to understand their benefits and limitations. We believe the field would greatly benefit from open datasets for benchmarking, and independent validation under the same experimental conditions. Furthermore, there is a need to improve the comparison of approaches that handle obfuscation, beyond changes of compiler and compiler options. Building a dataset that covers real-world obfuscations is fundamental given the huge space of possible obfuscation transformations and that each approach supports a different subset.
X. CONCLUSION
During the last 20 years, researchers have proposed many approaches to perform binary code similarity and have applied them to address important problems such as patch analysis, bug search, and malware detection and analysis. The field has evolved from binary code diffing to binary code search; from syntactic similarity to incorporate structural and semantic similarity; to cover multiple code granularities, to strengthen the robustness of the comparison (i.e., cross-optimization, cross-compiler, cross-OS, cross-architecture, obfuscation); to scale the number of inputs compared (e.g., through hashing, embedding, indexing); and to automatically learn similarity features.
Despite its popularity, the area had not yet been systematically analyzed. This paper has presented a first survey of binary code similarity. The core of the paper has systematized 61 binary code similarity approaches on four dimensions: the applications they enable, their approach characteristics, how the approaches are implemented, and the benchmarks and evaluation methodologies used to evaluate them. It has discussed the advantages and limitations of different approaches, their implementation, and their evaluation. It has summarized the results into easy to access tables useful for both beginners and experts. Furthermore, it has discussed the evolution of the area and outlined the challenges that remain open, showing that the area has a bright future. [122] BIL Beaengine [123] BitBlaze [124] VINE Boomerang [125] RTL Cuckoo [126] Dyninst [127] IDA [128] IDA LLVM [129] LLVM-IR NewBasic [130] McSema [131] LLVM-IR PIN [132] QEMU [133] TCG ROSE [134] SAGE-III Valgrind [135] VEX Vulcan [136] VULCAN-IR Implementation platforms. Table V shows the intermediate representation (IR) used by the platform, whether it supports static and dynamic analysis, the target architectures and operating systems it supports, and how it is released (open source or free binary). Among the 17 platforms, 12 support static analysis and 7 dynamic analysis. The functionality provided by static analysis platforms widely varies. IDA is a disassembler, Boomerang is a decompiler, and the rest offer diverse static analysis functionality such as disassembly, building control flow graphs and call graphs, IR simplifications, and data flow propagation. All dynamic analysis platforms can run unmodified binaries (i.e., no need to recompile or relink). QEMU is a whole system emulator that can run a full guest OS (e.g., Windows) on a potentially different host OS (e.g., Linux). Dyninst, PIN, and Valgrind execute an unmodified target program with customizable instrumentation (e.g., through binary rewriting) on the CPU of the host system. BAP and BITBLAZE build their dynamic analysis components on top of PIN and QEMU.
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